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Introduction  
Our aims are to contribute to a better understanding of Thomas Robert Malthus’s and David Ricardo’s 
methodologies and to study the methodology of two great economists, both in its interaction with their 
positive work and with each other’s criticism, in the context of “the most important literary 
correspondence in the whole development of Political Economy’’ (Keynes [19331 1972’90). The controversy 
between Malthus and Ricardo has not been explored in depth to date and its most exciting dimension, the 
methodological discussions, has never been made the subject of a specific study.’1 There are several 
reasons for this: the primary sources have not been available for very long; interest in methodology has not 
been prominent among historians of economic thought until recently; philosophers of science have not had 
enough patience to search for fragments of methodological considerations embedded in the pamphlets 
and letters of the scientists in the past. In this article, we provide a reconstruction of Malthus’s and 
Ricardo’s methodologies, and we conclude by weighing the differences and similarities between them. In 
another paper, we examine the impact of criticism in the controversy (Cremaschi and Dascal, forthcoming).  
 
 
Reconstruction of Malthus’s Methodology  
 
Newtonianism  
We now have available detailed information concerning the study of mathematics and natural philosophy 
that the young Thomas Robert Malthus carried out while he was a student at Cambridge (see James 1979, 
25-30). At the beginning of his first year, in a letter to his father, he mentions “MacLaurin, Newton, and 
Keill’s Physics. . . [and] Duncan’s Logick” and adds that his “chief study is mathematics” (James 1979,25). In 
another letter, he complains that the “plan of mathematical and philosophical reading pursued at 
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Cambridge is perhaps too much confined to speculation,” that “no lectures of any consequence in algebra 
and fluxions” are offered, “and yet a man would find himself very deficient in going through the branches 
of natural philosophy and Newton’s Principia, without a decent knowledge of both” (James 1979,29). These 
letters, combined with what we know of the intellectual climate in Cambridge at the time, show that the 
author of the polemical pamphlet of 1798 was trained in mathematics and had acquired firsthand 
knowledge of Newton’s Principia using Colin MacLaurin’s Account as a companion. In Donald Winch’s 
words, although Malthus’s education was aimed at preparing him for a career in the Church, “this was 
tantamount, in the circumstances of the day, to producing a Newtonian natural and moral philosopher” 
(Winch 1987, 18; James 1979, chap. 1; Waterman 1991a, 82-95). 
As a consequence, mention of Newton made by Malthus at several places should be taken seriously. For 
example, in On Political Economy (1824), he repeats Dugald Stewart’s description of Smith as “the Newton” 
of political economy (1986,7:257). In the first edition of the Essay on the Principle of Population,2 he repeats 
the familiar opposition between the “consistent theory of Newton” and “the wild and eccentric hypotheses 
of Descartes,” where the latter are assumed to be an example of the “old mode of philosophizing,” based 
on the abhorred “conjectures” and on making “facts bend to systems, instead of establishing systems upon 
facts” (1986, 159); the new mode of philosophizing, on the contrary, is based on “patient investigation, and 
well authenticated proofs” (1: 60n.; see also 1: 90).3 An instance of the application of the Newtonian 
method to moral subjects was provided in David Hume’s Essays. There is no proof that in 1798 Malthus had 
read the just-published first volume of Dugald Stewart’s Elements (1792). He certainly became acquainted 
with that work later, and in the Principles (1820), at various points he paraphrases Dugald Stewart’s 
considerations.  
 
  
Paley’s Theological Utilitarianism  
Another major influence on Malthus’s work was the legacy of the Cambridge via media (see Waterman 
1991b), whose leading figure was William Paley, the proponent of a version of theological utilitarianism 
that makes the moral quality of actions and states of affairs depend on the total quantity of “happiness” 
(understood in terms of physical pleasure) they are able to bring about (Paley [17851 1786, 18). Paley’s 
Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy provide both the basis for Malthus’s understanding of key 
notions, such as that of “laws of nature” (see 194, 203) and for his interest in population. Paley discussed 
the causes of population growth with a view toward working out policies favoring that growth. This concern 
did not derive from familiar considerations of national power, but from the theological utilitarian criterion 
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of the total sum of happiness. Increase in population implies growth in total, if not in average, happiness. 
He believed that the “final view of all rational politics is to produce the greatest quantity of happiness” and 
that “the quantity of happiness produced in any given district, so far depends upon the number of 
inhabitants, that... the collective happiness will be nearly in exact proportion of the numbers” (587). Yet, in 
his Natural Theology (1802), he accepted Malthus’s population theory and declared population growth to 
be a cause of “civil evil,” that is, “poverty, which, necessarily, imposes labour, servitude, restraint” ([18021 
1970, 540). Finally, Paley ’s Principles were a source of Malthus’s “philosophical Whiggism.” This had liberal 
implications, such as love of toleration and of “mild” government, opposition to slave trade, and even a 
Rousseauian distrust of property whose “paradoxical and unnatural” character was assumed to be 
apparent ([17851 1786, 92). It also had conservative implications, including a defense of existing property 
rights, on considerations of expediency if not of justice (see 92-93); a typically “country” Whig pro-agrarian 
and pro-rent bias (193,6 11-12), based on strictly political, as contrasted with economic and social, 
considerations; and an acute awareness of the costs of political change, leading to a choice for preservation 
of the British Constitution as an end whose desirability outweighed that of other desirable kinds of social 
change (book 6, chaps. 2 and 3).  
 
 
Against Conjectures  
In the Essay, the rejection of “mere conjectures” or of “suppositions, the probable realization of which 
cannot be inferred upon any just philosophical ground” (1986, 1: 8), is announced at the very beginning. 
Two postulates are introduced concerning laws of human nature (the necessity of food and the inability to 
eliminate the sexual drive), and consequences are deduced from them, to be subsequently confirmed by 
“experience, the true source and foundation of all knowledge” (Malthus [17981 1986, 1: 10). The structure 
of the Essay, thus, follows the blueprint of Hume’s ”Of the Balance of Trade,” which is also based on 
postulates from which phenomena are deduced, to be later confirmed by “experience” (see Waterman 
1988).  
The statement of an “acknowledged truth in philosophy,” namely, that “a just theory will always be 
confirmed by experiment” ([1798] 1986, 1 :6-7) sounds like a paraphrase of Isaac Newton’s fourth Regula 
Philosophandi, the most markedly anti-system and pro-experience of Newton’s methodological statement. 
4An important qualification is that “So much friction” occurs in practice that almost no theory can “be 
pronounced just, that has not stood the test of experience” (1:7). Malthus’s preoccupation is that no 
“untried theory” be advanced even as probable “till the arguments against it, have been maturely weighed, 
and clearly and consistently refuted” (1:7).  
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 The Predicament of the Moral Sciences  
It is unclear whether Malthus, as early as 1798, was aware of the peculiar difficulties posed by the moral 
sciences. It was a point discussed at length by the Scottish philosophers and, more recently, by Dugald 
Stewart (1854, 1:239-35; 2:19-20). For Malthus this was to become a major concern, but it may have not 
been foreign even to the first Essay. A belief in the non-mechanistic character of the human world was 
ascribed to Malthus by Würgler (1957, 194-200). But what Malthus contends in the Principles is that social 
studies should be granted a privileged status vis-h-vis the “study of the laws of nature,” in so far as their 
subject matter is more directly accessible in principle; and yet, the study of “the laws which regulate the 
movements of human society” is made less easy by obstacles unknown to the natural science. 5 The 
difficulty lies in the fact that human actions are prompted by motives not easily reducible to certain and 
regular causes. The obstacle is no longer located, as by Hume earlier, in the difficulty of “experiment” by 
means of introspection; the obstacle for Malthus lies in the impossibility of reducing human needs and 
tastes to mathematical figures. This will be the focal point of endless disagreements. Ricardo complained in 
this connection about Malthus’s “unscientific” attitude (letter to Mill, 1 January 182 1 ;Ricardo 1951-73, 
8:331). But Malthus’s stance (puce Paglin [1961] 1973, 21) had little to do with Burke’s Counter 
Enlightenment, being instead residue from the Scottish legacy (compare Stewart 1854, vol. 2, chap. 4; 1: 2).  
The sources of Malthus’s caution with regard to the “scientific” treatment of moral and political 
phenomena are best revealed in a passage in the second Essay in which Hume’s reminder that “of all 
sciences there is none where first appearances are more deceitful than in politics” is repeated (Malthus 
[1803] 1989, 2: 185). The application Malthus makes of Hume’s warning leans toward a defense of theory 
against so-called practice. The danger Malthus sees is that of incautiously transferring limited experience, 
like that one derived from the management of a small farm, to society as a whole (2:185). In the same 
work, Malthus contributes to what in the course of the nineteenth century was bound to become an 
endless complaint about the backwardness of “the science of moral and political philosophy” as contrasted 
with “physical science.” But he believes that lessons can be drawn from “the brilliant career of physical 
discovery,” so that social science and, as a consequence, the “improvement of human society,” will 
“partake” in the success of natural science (2:203). So Malthus’s attitude seems to be that of a 
wholehearted admirer of Newtonian natural science, committed to the project of edifying a science of 
morals and politics, but fully aware-in 1820 at least-of the difficulty of the task. With this broad picture in 
mind, we may now examine the discussion of the predicament of the moral sciences in the introduction to 
the Principles.  
Malthus declares political economy to be closer “to the science of morals and politics than to that of 
mathematics” (1: 2). Political economy is less precise than mathematics because the “practical results” of 
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its “propositions” depend upon “So variable a being as man” and “So variable a compound as the soil” (1: 
1). An intrinsic quality of these two entities, their variability, makes the identification of political economy 
with mathematics impossible (puce the author of the 1798 Essay); see also Malthus [18201 1989, 1:355). 
Thus, the kind of proofs which can be afforded cannot compete in certainty with “those which relate to 
figure and number” (1: 1).6  
 Yet Malthus is far from defending an unqualified methodological dualism. In fact he understands “the 
study of the laws of nature . . .in all its branches” as including both the “physical laws,” even those “by 
which the more distant parts of the universe are governed,” and “the laws which regulate the movements 
of human society,” and on principle he grants the latter the same status as the former. What makes a 
difference is the fact that they are “continually modified by human interference” (1 :13). This results, in 
turn, from the action of other laws of nature-those governing “human nature,” for example, the passions of 
men, their reason, and their self-interest. That is, while inquiring into “human society,” as contrasted with 
the more distant parts of the universe, we constantly face “the operations of that circle of causes and 
effects... which are acting and re-acting on each other” (1: 16). Thus, Malthus contrasts “great general 
principles” that may be said to “partake... of the certainty of the stricter sciences,” with other propositions 
of political economy that in no way can be said to share such a certainty and “absolutely require limitations 
and exceptions” (1: 8). Also, exceptions to the general principles, even if “of the most rare occurrence,” 
must be admitted. In fact, those principles “resemble... the great general rules in morals and politics 
founded upon the known passions and propensities of human nature” (1: 1-2).  
 Beyond the introduction, a few scattered remarks refer to the same concern: the measurement of value 
cannot be as precise and certain as the measurement of length and weight. In fact, neither “the object to 
be measured, nor the instrument of measurement comes within the pale of that certainty which belongs to 
stricter sciences” (2: 141-42). In another passage, Malthus adds that what matters is not only “the physical 
qualities of the materials which are acted upon” (1 :38 l), and he suggests that it is perhaps because they 
confine their attention to the latter that his opponents seem to confound commodities dealt with by 
political economy with figures and numbers (1:355). What matters is “the moral as well as the physical 
qualities of the agents” (1:38 1). In the example given by Malthus, customary patterns of work and 
consumption make the same market mechanisms yield opposing consequences in different countries such 
as England, Ireland, or Mexico (1: 375-401).  
One further aspect of the peculiarity of political economy vis-&-vis the more rigorous sciences is a greater 
degree of complexity in its subject matter; that complexity depends on the existence of feedback or on a 
“circle of causes and effects... which are acting and reacting on each other” (1: 16; compare 1: 249). When 
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read at the end of the twentieth century, after the “stricter sciences” have long been tackling precisely 
those circles of cause and effect, such a statement sounds prophetic.  
 
 
Against Oversimplification  
Malthus’s fear of excessive simplification, in light of what we have said so far, may be interpreted as a 
legacy of the Scottish hatred of esprit de système and of the Cambridge via media. Malthus’s attitude is not 
a sort of historicist contempt for theory. In the introduction to the Principles, Malthus singles out two 
opposing sources of error in political economy: first, “a precipitate attempt to simplify and generalize” 
(Malthus [18201 1989, 1: 6); second, the temptation to mistake “appearances, which are merely co-
existent and incidental… for causes” (1: 21). Against the tendency toward premature generalization, which 
Malthus acknowledges as prevailing at the time he is writing, he insists on the necessity to be prepared “to 
acknowledge the operation of more causes than one in the production of particular effects” (1: 6). It is 
precisely Ricardo’s unwillingness to take multicausality into account that Malthus will criticize on more than 
one occasion (letters to Ricardo, 20 June 1811, 23 February 1812,9 October 1814; in Ricardo 1951-73, 6: 28-
29, 82, 139-140). Malthus also insists on the need to admit “limitations and exceptions” to several 
propositions of political economy (Malthus [1820] 1989, 1: 8; compare 13). Exceptions, Malthus remarks in 
On Political Economy, are to be admitted in any classification; hence, this is not a peculiar feature of 
political economy as such ([1824] 1986, 7:262). “The sweeping generalizations,” Malthus concludes, appear 
“to be fatal to all clear explanation of the means by which the final result is attained” (7: 267). For him, this 
rule holds for “the watchmaker, the anatomist, and the natural philosopher’’ (7: 267). He asks why “it 
should be different with the political economist” (7: 267). The tendency to oversimplification goes hand in 
hand with an uncritical identification of the moral sciences with mathematics. The aforementioned passage 
of the Principles, where Say, Mill, and Ricardo are charged with having “considered commodities as if they 
were so many mathematical figures or arithmetical characters” (Malthus [18201 1989, 1:355), matches 
another revealing passage from On Political Economy, in which what he calls “the new school” is compared 
with physiocracy ([1824] 1986, 7: 297). The opposing error, that of mistaking appearances for causes, 
Malthus ascribes to “practical men,” and also to Smith on particular points (for example, to infer, from the 
low price of wheat during the first half of the eighteenth century, that wheat “is generally cheaper in rich 
than in poor countries”) ([18201 1989, 1:21). This mistake is even more damaging than the former, in so far 
as it leads to a theory which is “both complex and incorrect” ([18201 1989, 1:21).  
 Malthus views his own approach as escaping both errors by threading a kind of middle way between 
dogmatism and hyper-empiricism (see Wrigley 1986, 35; Würgler 1957, 197). This idea of a middle way-a 
legacy of his Cambridge education-is a sort of obsession for Malthus, showing up in contexts as different as 
methodology and positive theories, such as the theory of capital or that of consumption. We will return to 
this notion when dealing with the doctrine of “proportions.” Let us discuss now a consequence of Malthus’s 
criticism of oversimplification, namely, his view of the relationship between theory and experience.  
 
 
Theory, Experience, and Holism  
Besides the two main causes of error mentioned in the introduction, there is a third cause (a consequence 
of the first), namely, the unwillingness to bring theories to the test of experience. Malthus seems to be 
suggesting that the Ricardians stick to their own theories even if they prove “inconsistent with general 
experience” ([18201 1989, 1:10). Yet, that inconsistency is proof that these theories are “either radically 
false, or essentially incomplete” (1 :1 1). Malthus takes a stance on a question that will be debated at 
length by twentieth-century philosophers of science: he defends a holistic view of the empirical constraints 
posed by facts on theories. An “isolated fact” cannot refute a theory, insofar as a “consistent theory, which 
would account for the great mass of phenomena observable” should not be thought to be “invalidated by a 
few discordant appearances, the reality and the bearings of which there might not have been an 
opportunity of fully examining” (1: 10). Malthus’s requirement is that the principles of political economy 
“be carefully founded on an experience sufficiently extended” (1 :518), and the extension of the required 
experience is what marks the difference between his middle way and the “practical” attitude (see 1986, 
755). His position blends a vindication of theory against untutored empiricism with a reaction to 
intemperate theorizing which overlooks facts.7  
 It is worth noting that Malthus also takes an “intermediate” position between Ricardo and the latter’s 
inductivist critics, William Whewell and Richard Jones. After more than a decade of controversy with 
Ricardo, Malthus in a letter to Whewell (31 May 1831) defends him in the name of the rights of theoretical 
generalizations against Jones’s criticism, manifesting his fear that “the tide is setting too strong against” 
Ricardo (De Marchi and Sturges 1973,391).  
 
 
Laws of Nature  
In the first Essay (chaps. 1 and 9), Malthus’s basic postulates are said to express two of the “fixed laws of 
our nature” ([17981 1986, 1: 8, 59). Human nature is a part of Nature created by God, who has imposed on 
it “general laws” that are “fixed.” God may interrupt by miracles those laws, which he has freely chosen to 
confer upon nature. In other words, Malthus has a voluntarist conception, derived from Newton, of the 
laws of nature (see Waterman 1991a, 33; compare Heimann 1978; Cremaschi 1992, 61-62). Thus, laws of 
nature are “laws of God.” An expression apparently synonymous to “law of nature” is “law of necessity” 
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([17981 1986, 1: 9, 13, 48). In chapter 1 of the second Essay, the mention of the two postulates expressing 
basic “laws of nature” is omitted, while the “law of necessity” is still described as being “a law of nature” 
(Malthus [18031 1989, 1 :lo), and occasional mention, with less emphasis, is made elsewhere in the book of 
“the laws of nature” (2:87-88).  
 In the Principles, besides “general laws” and the usual “propositions of political economy,” occasional 
mention is also made of the “laws of nature.” This expression shows up in connection with the relationship 
between human society and its physical environment, the focus of which is rent (1: 147, 229). The laws of 
nature here are the laws of physical nature (as contrasted with human society); in “the production of 
necessaries alone,” as contrasted with all other productions, “the laws of nature are constantly at work to 
regulate their exchangeable value according to their value in use” (1: 147-48). Also “the separation of 
rents... is a law as invariable as the action of the principle of gravity,” and rent “is placed by the laws of 
nature on the land, by whomsoever possessed” (1: 155; compare 1:229). Thus, as a result of the “fertility of 
the soil... the great laws of nature have provided for the leisure or personal services of a certain portion of 
society” (1: 463). These words may be read as a mark of utter moral insensibility, and indeed would seem 
to confirm the Marxist cliché of a “reactionary” Malthus, if the expression “laws of nature” is 
anachronistically read in a natural law sense. What Marx and many after him did not realize is that Malthus 
was a Paley-utilitarian and a Newtonian theological voluntarist. Accordingly, he believed that general laws 
may cause partial evil that may in its turn be mitigated by the effects of other general laws but that may not 
be simply explained away by the divine origin of nature. Indeed, Malthus was a political Whig and he did 
not share Alexander Pope’s cosmic Toryism (according to which “whatever is, is right”); moreover, he was 
obsessed, no less than Paley was, by the problem of theodicy. For Malthus moral goodness was not an 
inherent quality of the laws of nature but was tantamount to the sum of happiness they were able to bring 
about. Thus, his defense of the status quo, of existing property arrangements, of rent, and even his nastiest 
positions on the relief of the poor, while he still held to the strong version of his principle of population, 
were justified in terms of a sum of happiness supposedly outweighing a sum of evils.  
 Notwithstanding the fact that talk of “natural laws” was the main target of Jeremy Bentham’s scorn, 
Ricardo seems to have understood more or less what Malthus meant. On one occasion, while professing 
the belief that talk of “laws of nature” is mere nonsense, he gave a charitable reading of a proposition 
couched by Malthus in terms of “laws of nature” by paraphrasing it in terms of a sum of happiness (letter to 
Francis Place, 9 September 1821; Ricardo 1951-73, 951-52). In short, in the light of the distinction between 
general principles and usual propositions of political economy, in the Principles Malthus may be said to be 
drawing a distinction between three kinds of scientific laws: first, the usual propositions of political 
economy, which are only probable and always admit exceptions; second, the most general principles, which 
may be considered as firmly established, being based on the most basic human passions; third, the fixed 
laws of nature, which admit no exceptions, being based on undeniable evidence concerning the nature of 
man and of the physical environment (only the principle of population and the theory of rent fall under the 
second heading and possibly the two unmentioned “postulates” fall under the third heading). Concerning 
laws of the third kind, counterevidence is dealt with without abandoning the principle and without 
permitting exceptions but rather by singling out causes hindering the action of the tendency, supposed to 
be at work (see Malthus [18201 1989, 1: 11). In the other cases, counterevidence may be handled either by 
recalling the merely probabilistic character of the law or by allowing exceptions.  
 
  
Analogy  
The topic of analogy is a crucial element of the Newtonian methodological legacy (see Gilardi 1988). In both 
the first Essay and the Principles, analogy is appealed to, without much discussion, as a criterion intended 
to rule out extravagant hypotheses. In the Essay, Malthus appeals to analogy against Jean-Antoine-Nicolas 
Condorcet. He argues that it is “unphilosophical to expect any specific event that was not indicated by 
some kind of analogy in the past.” Thus, as man has discovered many of the laws of nature, it is sensible to 
hope that “he will discover many more”; however, he argues, “no analogy seems to indicate that he will 
discover a sixth sense” ([1798] 1986, 1: 86). In the Principles, Malthus appeals to the rule of analogy in the 
context of the familiar iatro-political simile (or, the analogy between the human body and the body politic). 
In support of laissez-faire, he suggests that as the “ablest physicians are... the most inclined to trust to the 
healing power of nature, so governments should refrain from intervening in their subjects’ business unless 
it has been proved with overwhelming evidence that they should do so” ([1820] 1989, 1: 20). At another 
point, the simile is recalled in order to limit a conclusion that may be drawn from Malthus’s principle of 
population. By stressing the importance of what happens in the course of intervals between two 
permanent states, as when “the human body had been subjected to a very powerful stimulus, we should 
surely be cautious not to remove it too suddenly.” He goes on to say, if the country had been subjected to 
the excitement of excessive expenditure, “a great and sudden contraction of consumption” would be an 
unwise remedy (1: 520-21).  
 
 
Proportions  
 The claim of a decisive role for proportion (as opposed to absolute magnitudes) in political economy is the 
most intriguing aspect of Malthus’s methodology. His taste for “proportions” has not gone unnoticed (Emp- 
son 1837, 476), and it has been suggested that he was anticipating the concept of optimality (Pullen 1982; 
Costabile and Rowthorn 1985). The main theoretical claim of Malthus’s first Essay is couched in a 
mathematical framework. The law of population states: “Population, when unchecked, increases in 
geometrical ratio. Subsistence increases only in an arithmetical ratio” (Malthus [17981 1986, 1: 9). The law 
is presented as a self-evident truth in ideal cases and is made plausible by consideration of the reproductive 
power that each generation will display in turn and that will contribute to further population growth. In the 
second Essay, Malthus tries to add some empirical corroboration. After providing data on population 
growth in North America (which, as has often been noted, were misinterpreted, because immigration was 
overlooked), he concludes that these data suggest that “population . . .goes on doubling itself every twenty 
five years, or increases in a geometrical ratio” ([18031 1989, 1:12). The second part of the law is based on 
the decreasing productivity of cultivated land. Again, it has often been noted that empirical descriptions are 
flawed because they do not take into account the actual or virtual effects of technical improvements on the 
productivity of the soil. Indeed, Malthus contends that “the means of subsistence, under circumstances the 
most favourable to human industry, could not possibly be made to increase faster than in an arithmetical 
ratio” (1: 15; see also [17981 1986, 1: 14-17).  
Regardless of these differences, in both formulations the problem is similar to the composition of forces in 
dynamics. A third factor, “the strong law of necessity,” appears, “acting as a check upon the greater power” 
of population, so that the rates of increase of the two factors be kept equal ([18031 1989,l: 15; see also 
[17981 1986,l: 14-1 7).Malthus’s claim of a decisive role played by proportions in political economy 
probably resulted from generalization from his diagram of the rates of increase of means of subsistence 
and population.8 In the Principles, he makes a sweeping generalization that “all the great results in political 
economy...depend upon proportions” ([1820] 1989, 1: 432).9 From his doctrine of proportions he derives an 
aversion to the “tendency to extremes” (1: 352n), one of the great sources of error in political economy 
“where so much depends upon proportions” (2: 252; this last specification was added in the 1836 edition). 
In the 1817 edition of the Essay, he derives from that doctrine a criticism of the argument that “what is 
good to a certain extent is good to any extent” ([1798] 1986, 2: 70). In addition, Malthus applies the 
principle to individual positive doctrines on saving, on unproductive consumption and effective demand, on 
population, and on the distribution of property.  
The doctrine of proportions is intrinsically limited by the difficulty of ascertaining where the right 
proportion lies. Thus, we may safely believe that there is a point at which “the division of property is best 
suited to the actual circumstances of the society” and yet “we may not know how to place it” (Malthus 
[1820] 1989, 1: 9-10). One consequence of this imprecision is the need for “modifications, limitations and 
exceptions” to every “rule or proposition” (1: 7). As a whole, it favors laissez-faire, albeit more on negative 
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than on positive grounds. Malthus contends that interventions aimed at increasing the proportion of 
consumption or of investment in one sector of the economy are always based on guesswork as to the 
desirable proportions and would be poorer approximations to the correct proportion than those brought 
about by historical circumstances. Yet, laissez-faire allows several exceptions and, accordingly, no clear-cut 
policy recommendations-not even pure noninterventionism may be derived from this doctrine. The 
unknowable correct proportion may be supposed to act-in those cases where it has been inadvertently 
reached-as a hidden cause promoting the progress of wealth, a cause which may be at work ubiquitously, 
and whose function is roughly equivalent to that of François Quesnay’s and Smith’s “animal principle” (1: 
432). This doctrine seems to condemn us to uncertainty since “it necessarily opens the way to differences 
of opinion” concerning optimal proportions “and thus throws a kind of uncertainty over the science of 
political economy” (1: 515). This confirms political economy’s “nearer resemblance to the sciences of 
morals and politics, than to the science of mathematics” (1:518; see also 1:2).  
 In Malthus the doctrine of the “middle” relates more to the calculus of fluxions than to Aristotelian ethics. 
In Observations on the Effect of the Corn Laws ([1814] 1986), he declares that much of morals and politics 
“seems to be of the nature of the problems de maximis et minimis in fluxions; in which there is always a 
point where a certain effect is the greatest, while on either side of this point it gradually diminishes” 
([18141 1986, 7: 102). This statement is repeated in an 1829 letter to Whewell (De Marchi and Sturges 
1973, 387). And yet, Malthus seems to have been discouraged from applying the calculus of fluxions to 
political economy by the difficulty he saw using mathematical tools for economic questions. He avows 
inability “to see how such propositions could be put into proper language for a fluxional solution, varying as 
the result must do with the fertility of soils and the productiveness of capitals” (De Marchi and Sturges 
1973, 387). Regarding the desirability and difficulties of applying mathematical tools, Malthus confesses to 
have been convinced by the example provided in Whewell’s papers that mathematical calculations may 
sometimes be advantageously brought into political economy, “particularly with a view to determining the 
different degrees in which certain objects are affected, under different hypotheses” (De Marchi and Sturges 
1973, 387). Yet, the major difficulty “is getting data...sufficiently near the truth; and such as can be stated 
distinctly in mathematical language” (387). There are two points at stake: first, the usefulness of 
mathematical tools (he acknowledges their usefulness in terms of analytic precision and adds his cherished 
idea of a “resemblance” between questions of political economy and the problem de maximis et minimis); 
and second, the applicability of mathematical theories to practical problems. On the second point, Malthus 
echoes Adam Smith’s and Dugald Stewart’s objections to “political arithmetic,” prompted by lack of faith in 
the possibility of obtaining empirically significant figures (see Smith [17761 1976, book 4, chap. 5, part b, 
par. 30; letter to George Chalmers, 10 November 1785, in Smith 1977, 288; Stewart 1854, 2: 33, 331-32). 
Besides, there seems to be the further difficulty of reducing the complexity of variable factors, such as land 
and capital, to the simplicity of mathematical language.  
 
 
Definitions  
Malthus and Ricardo explicitly disagreed on the subject of scientific language. This was a widespread 
concern by the time of Lavoisier’s reform of the language of chemistry at the end of the eighteenth 
century. Malthus’s reflections on these points seem to elaborate on E. Bonnot de Condillac and Dugald 
Stewart (see Condillac [17461 1947,4044 and 106-10; Stewart 1856, l: 197, 282-89,2: 5-22). Toward the end 
of his life, Malthus wrote an essay entitled Definitions in Political Economy ([1871 1986). The points worth 
our attention here are two: the first is the threefold partition of the sciences: (a) mathematics, which offers 
fewer problems, since, even if “words may vary... the meaning... is always the same” ([1827] 1986, 85; 
compare 8: 115); (b) natural history, where the problem may arise of assigning one individual to one of two 
“adjoining classes” (85); (c) the sciences of morals and politics, where one more source of complication 
arises, since terms may be “understood differently by different persons, according to their different habits 
and opinions” (85). Projects of radical reform in the language of the latter type of sciences are unpractical, 
since the terms “are of constant application in the daily concerns of life” (8: 6). Malthus suggests, 
accordingly, that in political economy two linguistic authorities should be followed, namely, the 
“conversation of educated persons” and “the most celebrated writers in the science” ([1827] 1986, 7). 
Deviations from common language may be introduced, with prudence, only for clarity and consistency sake 
(8: 7). In the Principles, he criticizes Ricardo for departing from “the ordinary and most correct language of 
society” (Malthus [1820] 1989,2: 217; see also a footnote added in 1836 to page 336; in Malthus 1820,2: 
244-45). Malthus’s attitude regarding language may be also described as being via media, if, on the one 
hand, he charges Ricardo with pursuing an untenable ideal of separation between ordinary and scientific 
language, and on the other hand, he refuses to follow Whewell because of his carelessness about 
definitions. For Malthus, scientific definitions are a type of hypothesis to be confirmed by the growth of 
knowledge. Hence, “new definitions of terms” and “our advances in knowledge... act and react upon each 
other” (De Marchi and Sturges 1973, 392-93).  
 
 
Partial Conclusions on Malthus’s Methodology  
The main philosophical influences on Malthus’s work were, first, Scottish Newtonianism-namely, 
MacLaurin, Hume, and Dugald Stewart-and, second, Paley and the Cambridge via media. Both groups 
exhibited a preoccupation with the peculiarity of social studies, a concern with the role of scientific 
language, and a peculiar way of granting social science partial autonomy, while maintaining some 
interaction between the latter and moral discourse. Malthus’s population theory and his political economy 
have much in common both in terms of doctrinal contents and in terms of methodological inspiration. 
Nonetheless, Malthus’s approach evolved, with the turning point being around 1803. In 1798, Malthus’s 
own “experimental” attitude on moral subjects did not lead him any further than Hume’s thought 
experiments. In the second Essay and in the Principles, he became increasingly aware of the role of 
multicausality, of the existence of feedback loops, of the imprecision of any mathematical model, and of 
our inability to ascertain the right proportion of factors that should be at work in various circumstances.  
 
 
Reconstruction of Ricardo’s Methodology  
 
“A Man from Another Planet”  
 The first piece of the puzzle of Ricardo’s intellectual background is his education. Piero Sraffa (1955, 31) 
argued that he may have attended the celebrated Amsterdam Talmud Torah for two years, yet no decisive 
proof is available. In any event, Ricardo’s education was not as completely “neglected” as he sometimes 
complained (letter to Mill, 12 September 1817; Ricardo 1951-73, 7: 190) and was probably dual, including 
an unknown proportion of Jewish and secular elements.10 Certainly, the mere fact of being an intellectual 
outsider contributed to the molding of Ricardo’s mind, making him “a man from another planet” (“Lord 
Brougham’s Sketch of Ricardo in Parliament”; Ricardo 1951-73, 5: 296).  
The second component of Ricardo’s intellectual background was his experience in the world of finance out 
of which a growing interest in questions of monetary, commercial, and fiscal policies arose. By age fourteen 
he was employed by his father in the stock exchange (Ricardo [1824] 1955, 4). When he married at age 
twenty-one, he began to do business on his own; that was made possible by an already acquired reputation 
that granted him the support of an eminent banking house in the city. He acted as a stockjobber and soon 
became one of the most respected and influential men in his trade, mainly because of his ability and 
extraordinary quickness in perceiving the tendencies of the stock market (see Sraffa 1955, 67-94). Ricardo 
did not have a high opinion of what the stock exchange could offer from an intellectual point of view, and 
of the rather restricted vision of financial affairs by most of its members, who “consider more, the 
immediate effect of passing events, rather than their distant consequences” (letter to John Sinclair, 31 
October 1814; Ricardo 1951-73, 6: 150-51). The third and universally ignored contribution to Ricardo’s 
intellectual development was the influence of Unitarian theologians. The fact that Ricardo’s conversion 
from Judaism was not to the Church of England, but to the most radical sect of Dissenters, fell apparently 
into oblivion. 11 Sraffa rescued this piece of information, but he could hardly be said to have overstressed its 
                                                             
10 On the education question, see Sraffa 1955, 31-32; Heertje 1970, 591-92; 1975.78-79; Weatherall 1976, 12-13. 
11 This fact was mentioned in the obituary in the Sunday Times, 14 September 1823, but it is remarkable that the 
“Memoir” avoids any mention of Ricardo’s conversion ([Moses] Ricardo [1824] 1955,5). Jacob Hollander ([I9101 
implications.12 In fact, the impact of the Unitarian literature on the English intellectual scene of those 
decades was not unknown (see Halévy 1901, 3: 239-40). No less than the circumstance that being a 
Unitarian in the last three decades of the century almost implied being a revolutionary in politics (see Clark 
1985).  The known facts are as follows: Ricardo left the Jewish faith around 1793, the year of his marriage, 
and shortly after appears to have become a Unitarian. We know that he became a “hearer” (parishioner) of 
the Unitarian ministers Robert Aspland and Thomas Belsham and that even after he moved to Gatcomb he 
never abandoned Unitarianism. For many years Ricardo attended Belsham’s and Aspland’s sermons and 
probably also the lecture courses on various subjects delivered after Sunday service to a more restricted 
audience, in addition to enjoying private conversations with them (see Sraffa 1955, 37-43). The Unitarian 
ministers’ understanding of their task was centered, in a Christian Enlightener’s mood, on the promotion of 
knowledge, and they encouraged their hearers to improve their education, while fostering specialization in 
one or two subjects chosen among those which were deemed “useful,” instead of being “without the grasp 
of the human mind” (Belsham 1826-27, 256). Approved subjects included the study of astronomy (which, 
according to Belsham and following a belief shared also by Hume’s Cleanthes, is useful in so far as it 
prompts reverence to the wisdom displayed by God in arranging the order of the Universe); the study of 
“the powers of nature in order to improve the arts of life”; the study of “the principles of the social 
compact, and the laws of civil society” (Belsham 1826-27, 256). Useless inquiries were those on 
“substances, and essences, the nature of matter and spirit, the mode of the divine existence” (255).  
 Besides exegetical studies in the New Testament, Thomas Belsham wrote a treatise, Elements of the 
Philosophy of the Mind, that drew inspiration mainly from David Hartley and Joseph Priestley and was often 
critical of Dugald Stewart. The points of interest to us are the following:  
(a) The status of scientific language: Belsham favors a separation of scientific terminology and ordinary 
language; given that “many combinations of ideas occur frequently in the arts and sciences, which do not 
occur in common life,” it follows that “all arts and sciences have terms peculiar to themselves which do not 
occur in common life” (Belsham 1801, xvi).  
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
1968,33-34) still seems to be ignorant of Ricardo’s adherence to Unitarianism, and only with Sraffa has this 
circumstance been brought to light again (see Sraffa 1955,3743; Heertje 1975,79-80). 
12 On Ricardo’s attendance of the “instructions” of Thomas Belsham, see Sraffa 1955, 3940. Sraffa mentions two 
Unitarian sermons of 1813 and 1814 among the “oddments” in Ricardo’s pamphlets (now at the Goldsmith Library at 
London University) without mentioning the authors and titles (I95 1-73, 10:402). The two sermons are Lindsay 1813, 
and Travers 1814. The sermon by James Lindsay (an acquaintance of Ricardo; see Sraffa 1955,40-41), the somewhat 
dull title notwithstanding, argues for one of the Unitarians’ main claims, that is, that Christianity consists of “a few 
plain truths” compatible with reason, while the “metaphysical subtleties” (Lindsay 18 13, 29) and the “unmeaning 
distinctions of theological systems” (4) of the Middle Ages resulted from corruption of Christianity. 
(b) Essences: our knowledge never reaches the “real” essence of any substance, for example, “that peculiar 
contexture of its constituent particles upon which its peculiar properties depend”; thus, “of real essences 
we know nothing” (xii); natural science, or “Experimental Philosophy” is based on “observations of the 
senses,” and the latter “do not teach us the real essence of substances” (xxxii); intuition does play a role, 
but this role is confined to demonstration, and “Science” in a proper sense is knowledge acquired by 
demonstration (xxxiii).  
(c) The status of the “moral sciences”: Belsham favors an idea opposite Stewart’s. On Locke’s authority he 
argues that “as moral ideas are equally capable of strict definition with mathematical ideas, demonstration 
is equally applicable to moral subjects” (xlv). In some cases at least, the reasoning on the behavior of 
voluntary agents may reach the same degree of precision as “that with which we foretell the effects of 
physical causes” (lxxxiii), since also in these cases “the same cause operating in the same circumstances will 
invariably produce same effects” (lxxxii-iii).  
(d) The status and function of the science of politics: natural philosophy differs from the philosophy of mind 
in that, while the former has the task “to investigate the laws, and to resolve the phenomena, of the 
material universe,” the latter “investigates the laws, and explains the phenomena, of the intellectual world” 
(1). Yet, Belsham adds, “knowledge, says Lord Bacon, is power” (2), and thus both fields of knowledge are 
of use in bettering the human condition either in terms of material comfort or of moral awareness. The 
science of politics is part of the philosophy of the mind, providing the ruler with “a profound knowledge of 
human nature” and teaching him “how to guide the various passions and contending interests of parties, 
and of individuals, to the general good” (4).  
(e) Newton’s regulae philosophandi: the version adopted by Belsham omits the fourth rule. This rule was 
first added in the third edition of the Principia (1726) and was, therefore, unknown to the first popularizers 
of Newton. It was emphasized by Hume and the Scottish tradition; and, as we have argued in discussing 
Malthus’s methodology, it was meant to stress a demand for empirical constraints on theories. It should be 
kept in mind that Ricardo was a disciple of Thomas Belsham at a stage of his life when he decided to 
dedicate his intellectual abilities to the natural sciences. The fourth element to be considered is that as 
soon as his improved economic conditions gave him leisure, Ricardo became interested in mathematics, 
geology, mineralogy, and chemistry. According to the “Memoir,” he was drawn to science by the “example 
and instigation of a friend” ([Ricardo] [1824] 1955, 6; compare J. Hollander [1910] 1968, 35-36; Sraffa,  
1955, 35). This friend could have been William Frend (himself a Unitarian) or Joshua Basevi, or also - we 
would add - Thomas Belsham, a name such as to prompt reticence by the author of the “Memoir.” These 
scientific interests are supposed by Sraffa to have had “a more decisive influence on Ricardo’s characteristic 
cast of mind than the teaching of his later mentors, James Mill and Bentham” (Sraffa 1955, 35; compare J. 
Hollander [1910] 1968, 35-36).  
 A fifth, and highly controversial, piece of intellectual influence on Ricardo have been Benthamism. The 
early studies of the Utilitarian movement have stressed the importance of Ricardian doctrines for the 
Benthamites; but the other side of the relationship, that is, the influence of Bentham and Mill on Ricardo 
has been left by Elie Halévy in the state of conjecture, often repeated and never explored. Schumpeter 
(1954, 471) denied, in his rather cavalier way, the existence of any trace of such influence, and Sraffa 
concluded that “there is little doubt that his influence was negligible” on the theory of the Principles (Sraffa 
1951, xx-xxi; see also 1955, 35). More recently, Samuel Hollander has attacked, in his own cavalier way 
(ignoring all counterevidence) the existence of any connection of this kind. Hollander is right in stressing 
that Ricardo was adopted by the Benthamite coterie only after he had already begun to write on economic 
subjects, and indeed after he had already elaborated his main doctrines (S. Hollander 1985, 1:15-36). He is 
correct to write, “James Mill was interested in economic theory as a weapon in the service of his political 
program” (S. Hollander 1985,1: 28) and in stressing Ricardo’s growing awareness of Mill’s dogmatic attitude 
in almost every field, ranging from value theory to population (see also Rizvi forthcoming). In fact, the 
relationship with James Mill did have an impact on Ricardo, but more in those “practical” matters (style of 
composition, publishing policies, and direct engagement in politics) in which James Mill was really 
interested than in matters of “method,” as fancied by Halévy. It is also true that Ricardo raised doubts, 
especially toward the end of his life, about Mill’s overly dogmatic positions in political and economic 
matters and was suspicious of Mill’s inclination to understand political economy as a handmaid for his 
politics.13 On the other hand, he admired Mill’s History of British India, and he mainly followed Mill’s 
reading list in philosophy and politics. All these circumstances must be interpreted with caution: we are 
confronted with a gap between the intellectual stature of Mill and that of Ricardo, between Ricardo’s 
modesty and Mill’s near-fanaticism, as well as with the possibility that Ricardo and the Benthamites were 
talking at cross-purposes, originating from the fact that he had been ‘adopted’ by the latter on political 
grounds. Thus, Ricardo’s occasional claims to Benthamism should neither be ignored, as Samuel Hollander 
does, nor taken too literally.  
The sixth element is provided by the economists who influenced Ricardo, that is, by Adam Smith, Malthus, 
and Jean-Baptiste Say. Ricardo had for many years a rather close relationship with Say. They met, 
corresponded, commented on each other’s works and on each other’s criticisms in the various editions of 
their books (see Weatherall 1976, 103-04; Blaug 1958, 64-65 and 89-90; S. Hollander 1979, 500-2). Ricardo 
quoted Say approvingly on a few occasions, while harshly criticizing his doctrine of utility. For our purposes, 
it is important that Say’s Traité, particularly in the “Discours Préliminaire,” includes extended 
methodological discussions. The main theses are: facts treated by earlier political economists are capable of 
                                                             
13 For example, in his correspondence with Mill, on one occasion he defends the views of opponents of the principle of 
population (see letter to Mill, 18 December 1821, enclosure, Ricardo’s Notes on Mill’s “Elements of Political 
Economy”; 1951-73, 9: 126; see also S. Hollander 1985,27, and, for a more balanced account, Collini, Winch, and 
Burrow 1983, 112-26). 
becoming the subject matter of an exact science (Say 1803, iv); a science of statistics may be distinguished 
from political economy-the former deals with particular or variable facts, while the latter deals with 
constant or general facts (v); Adam Smith may be criticized precisely for having assembled randomly 
general and particular facts (vi, xxiv); and political economy, like the other exact sciences, is composed of a 
reduced number of general facts, plus a few principles (the relationships between general facts) and those 
basic elements are reached by way of “analysis,” on the basis of facts (xi). Several similarities with Ricardo 
are apparent: a tendency to discard all specific particular and changing facts from the “science” of political 
economy; the actual stress on “synthesis,” that is, on the deductive process (the inductive process of 
“analysis” being taken somehow for granted); the charge leveled at Adam Smith of lack of consistency. Yet, 
Halévy’s “French connection,” linking Ricardo via Say with the Physiocrats, is one more piece of Franco-
centric mythology.  
 
 
The Philosophy of David Ricardo  
Schumpeter’s claim that Ricardo was no utilitarian “because that busy and positive mind had no philosophy 
at all” (1954,47 1) seems to be supported by the apparent lack of methodological statements in Ricardo’s  
works. If one looks at his “Notes on Malthus” (Ricardo 195 1-73, vol. 2), the “no philosophy” feeling seems 
to draw further support from the absence of comments on the introduction to Malthus’s Principles. Yet, 
Ricardo’s correspondence manifests his vivid reaction to the main claim of that introduction (letter to Mill, 
1 January 1821; Ricardo 1951-73, 8:331); he read philosophy in depth; and the philosophical and 
methodological remarks scattered through his correspondence, when patiently assembled, afford much 
more than Schumpeter would have expected. In a word, Ricardo was no self-made, “unphilosophical” or 
Metaphysik-frei, scientist. On a couple of occasions, Ricardo declared his own allegiance to “the Bentham 
and Mill school” (letter to Place, 9 September 1821; Ricardo 1951-73,952; letter to Maria Edgeworth,  
December 1822; 1951-73 9: 239).14 Besides, he may have shared the widespread understanding of political 
economy as a part of the “science of legislation” (see Collini, Winch, and Burrow 1983, 115-16). Mill, after 
Ricardo had completed his Principles, set out to initiate him in that science, to which his own History of 
India, he thought, could be “no bad introduction” (Ricardo 1951-73, 6: 195; compare 231). Ricardo was 
highly appreciative of this work; yet, it is precisely the most Scottish, namely, conjectural historical, and the 
                                                             
14 In these letters, Ricardo declares his belief in the greatest happiness principle, without any mention of Bentham’s 
philosophy as a whole. There is still one cryptic sentence to explain: ‘‘I like the formal method, after the manner of 
Bentham and Mill” (letter to Maria Edgewonh, 11 January 1823; 1951-73. 9:257-62, 259). In the context of this letter, 
the “formal method” turns out to be Mill’s “art of laying down your thoughts, in the way most easy to apprehension”; 
this reference, in the context of a semi-serious discussion of the subject of “potatoe flour” as an alternative to wheat, 
amounts to little less than poking fun at Bentham and Mill. 
least Benthamite of Mill’s writings.  
 In 1817 and 1818, Ricardo read philosophy intensively, partly under Mill’s guidance. From his 
correspondence with Mill, the skeptic Pierre Bayle appears to have been his favorite reading, and indeed 
long abstracts from Bayle’s Dictionnaire and Pensées Diverses are copied in his commonplace books (see 
Ricardo 195 1-73, 10:394). Also Locke’s Essay is praised: even if he did “not take much pleasure in such 
subjects as that Essay treats of,” Ricardo believed there were a number of “points which... he has 
successfully established” (letter to Mill, 9 November 1817; Ricardo 195 1-73,7:206). Hume’s Essays, Bacon, 
Dugald Stewart, Reid, Berkeley, Warburton, Beattie, and finally Montesquieu and Millar are mentioned 
among Ricardo’s readings (letter to Mill, 19 October 1817; 12 August 1818; Ricardo 1951-73,7:196,277-78). 
On one occasion he expresses the wish to discuss with Mill whether he saw “no weight in the objections 
offered by Reid and, I believe, by Dugald Stewart, to the mind perceiving only ideas, and not external 
objects” (letter to Mill, 18 December 1817; Ricardo 1951-73,7:229). It is striking that Hartley and Priestley 
are never mentioned. We cannot say whether the reason for this is that Ricardo had already become 
acquainted with them in a previous phase, under Belsham’s tutorship; let us note that he had no need to 
read them directly in order to touch upon their ideas as these were discussed both by Belsham and by 
several authors he was reading at the time.  
Two comments by Ricardo are worth noting. On one occasion metaphysics is mentioned incidentally, being 
understood in the sense of epistemology-cum-philosophy of mind; in this connection Ricardo comments on 
the commonsense opponents of Hume’s skepticism that they are unable “to remove the difficulties which 
make the subject of metaphysics so perplexing,’’ because their solutions on some points “would only 
transfer your difficulties to some other” (letter to Mill, 12 August 18 18; Ricardo 195 1-73,7:277-78). The 
other comment is on Bayle and how difficult it is to “account for evil in a world governed by a Being of 
unbounded benevolence” (letter to Mill, 9 November 18 17; 195 1-73, 7:206). This had much to do with the 
teachings of the Unitarian divines. In fact, evil was one of the chief theological concerns of both Priestley 
and Belsham.15 There may be a link also between these considerations and Ricardo’s claim that in political 
economy one should avoid consideration of the moral usefulness of the factors under scrutiny (see “Notes 
                                                             
15 Thomas Belsham believed that the fact “that evil, natural and moral, is unavoidable in the works of God, is a 
problem of very difficult solution” (1826-27,2:37); if we consider the world iis a whole, “we see enough” to be satisfied 
“that the result of it is a great preponderance of good... but when we consider the divine dispensations in detail, we... 
discover that they are far beyond the reach of human sagacity” (2: 36-37). Priestley says, “Even everything painful and 
disagreeable in the world appears to a philosopher. . . to be excellently provided as a remedy of some greater 
inconvenience, or a necessary means of a much greater happiness; so that. . . he sees all temporary evils and 
inconveniencies to vanish, in the glorious prospect of the greater good to which they are subservient” (1775, xvii). This 
sounds like Ricardo on “intervals” and “permanent states” (see, for example, letter to Malthus, 24 January 18 17; 195 
1-73, 7: 120); perhaps also for him “the prospect of a greater good” to be carried by the next permanent state was 
enough to “outweigh all temporary pain and distress” occurring during intervals. 
on Malthus”; Ricardo 1951-73,2:210,337-38). It may have been skepticism with regard to the scope of our 
moral knowledge that convinced him that a value-free attitude was the safest to be taken by a social 
scientist. This attitude was precisely what Marx praised when he defined him a “Stoic,” contrasting him 
with the “priest” Malthus. Ironically, this was also a consequence of a theological outlook. Finally, Antoine 
Destutt de Tracy deserves mention. He is the only philosophical writer mentioned in Ricardo’s Principles (in 
the third edition). The definition of measurement in his Eléments d’idéologie ([1803] 1804, 187) is quoted 
approvingly (having in mind the quest for an invariable measure of value); Ricardo adds in a footnote that 
he regrets, however, that Destutt de Tracy had shared Say’s mistaken definitions of “value,” “wealth,” and 
“utility” (Ricardo 1951-73, 1:284).  
 
 
Against Vagueness  
 We have mentioned that Bentham had his own theory of language. Its inspiration may be found in 
Diversions of Purley by John Horne Tooke (see Stephen [19001 1950, 1: 136-42). It is a sentence from the 
latter that Mill chooses as an epigraph to chapter 9 (“Abstraction”) of his Analysis. Bentham’s projects for 
the radical reform of legal language are inspired by nominalism, by the idea of the possibility of a new 
foundation of language as such, starting with its basic (and ahistorical) elements, and by a suspicious 
attitude toward ordinary language (see Mack 1962, 151200; Stephen [19001 1950, 1: 136-42; 2:4549; Guidi 
1991,58-72). We have described above Belsham’s views on language and his artificialist strategy vis-i-vis 
the language of the sciences. It is striking that Belsham and Bentham headed toward almost identical 
policies, even if on the basis of different doctrines. A Bentham-like mood, even if probably inspired by the 
Hartley-Priestley-Belsham legacy, inspires Ricardo on questions of scientific language, starting with the 
charge he levels at Malthus of “sometimes attaching one meaning” to words and “sometimes ~t~~other” 
(letter to Mill, 1 January 1821; Ricardo 1951-73, 8:331). In a similar vein, he doubts his own ability to reach 
such “a degree of precision and accuracy” (letter to Trower, 22 March 1818; 1951-73, 7:259) as to be able 
to define “accurately and rigidly, the terms employed,” as requested by Trower (Trower to Ricardo, 28 
February 1818; 1951-73, 8:256). A similar preoccupation with conditions of meaningfulness of scientific 
statements is revealed by a remark in the Principles concerning the need to define the medium in which 
one commodity’s value is estimated, in order to avoid that “no idea can be attached to the proposition” 
(1:377). Next after his aversion to vagueness comes his aversion to disputes on words. Various 
disagreements in political economy are said to derive from misunderstandings on the use of words, rather 
than from different opinions on facts: some of Malthus’s objections “are merely verbal” (letter to Malthus, 
4 September 1820; 1951-73, 8:228; compare letter to Place, 1 November 1819; 1951-73, 8:121); criticism of 
Bosanquet’s views on the issue of paper currency includes equivocation over the use of the word “excess” 
(3:228); and the charge of confusing disputes over terminology for discussions of facts is often leveled at 
Malthus (Ricardo [1928] 1951, 2: 210, 337-38).  
 Ricardo often mentions the gap between ordinary and scientific language. For instance, accumulation of 
capital is not “hoarding” (Ricardo [1928] 1951, 2: 320n). We have seen how Malthus too shared this 
awareness, his more sympathetic view of ordinary language notwithstanding. And yet, the issue of the 
appropriateness and consistency of language was often raised between them.  
 
 
Laws, Tendencies, and Natural and Necessary Causes  
For Ricardo, “to determine the laws which regulate” the distribution of the whole produce of the earth 
between rent, profit, and wages “is the principal problem in Political Economy” (Ricardo [18171 1951, 1 5).  
This has been often contrasted with Malthus’s definition of political economy as “an inquiry into the nature 
and causes of wealth” (letter to Ricardo, 9 October 1820; Ricardo 1951-73,8: 278). Ricardo’s definition 
grants political economy a more limited scope, assuming more factors as given. For example, effective 
demand is a problem for Malthus, while for Ricardo it is constant. The latter, indeed, leaves the choice 
between luxuries and indolence, as a subject not pertaining to a value-free science, to morals, but he 
assumes that the “wants and tastes of mankind” (letter to Malthus, 23 October 1814; 1951-73,6: 132, 148) 
will always provide sufficient effective demand for whatever amount of commodities will be produced.  
A more significant feature of Ricardo’s definition of political economy is the choice of “laws” instead of 
causes. Halévy made much of that difference. He argued that because the term “law” never appears in The 
Wealth of Nations.16 Ricardo may be thought to have inherited from the Physiocrats a conception of 
political economy as a “science of laws” (Halévy 1901,2:219,246). The fact, however, is that the one 
undoubted French influence on Ricardo, Say’s Traité, mentions “general facts” and “principles,” not “laws,” 
and the implications of Ricardo’s choice of the term “law” remain accordingly less obvious. A clarification of 
Ricardo’s use of the cognate terms “principle,” “axiom,” and “tendency” is in order here. Ricardo in the 
Principles mentions laws twice more. In chapter 2, he mentions the “laws which regulate the progress of 
rent” and “those which regulate the progress of profits” ([18171 195 1, 1 :68).In chapter 5, he mentions the 
laws by which wages are regulated (1:105).In chapter 2, he mentions the “common principles of supply and 
demand” (1:69); “principle” here seems to refer to something more general than a law, the latter resulting 
from principles when applied to a specific set of cases. Ricardo employs also the term “axiom” on one 
occasion, referring to what he assumes to be an incorrect proposition, namely, “that the price of 
commodities depends solely on the proportion of supply to demand, or demand to supply” (1 :382). Thus, 
Ricardo had in mind a distinction between basic laws, the principles or axiomata, and derived laws, such as 
the laws regulating wages and profits. In both cases, however, their status is that of formulations of 
constant and invariable cause-effect relations. The sharp difference that Ricardo carefully draws is that 
                                                             
16 In The Wealth of Nations, Smith systematically uses the Newtonian term “principle” to refer to laws. 
between “natural and constant” cause-and-effect relations and “accidental causes” and “temporary 
effects” (1:91-92, 11511; compare 195 1-73,7: 120). His plea for a theoretical attitude is based precisely on 
the need to discover the “natural and constant” causes (see De Marchi 1970, 258-66). If one keeps in mind 
Bernard Cohen’s reconstruction of the “Newtonian style,” that identifies the first phase of theory-building 
with simplification and construction of a mathematical analogue of the explanandum (Cohen 1980,63-64), 
Ricardo’s preference for idealized models may be said to follow closely a blueprint that had been drawn by 
Newton (even if not by the Scots’ Newton). What are Ricardo’s “principles” or “axiomata”? He never 
offered a list. De Marchi has made an attempt to single out three of them: the law of diminishing returns, 
the principle of population, Say’s law (see De Marchi 1970, 259). One should add perhaps: the “common 
principles of supply and demand.” As far as the status of his laws is concerned, Ricardo twice makes the 
commonplace comparison with the law of gravity, that is, with the eighteenth-century paramount example 
of a scientific law ([ 18171 1951, 1:108, 120; see also letter to Malthus, 27 March 18 15; 195 1-73, 6:204). 
On a couple of occasions, but in less binding contexts such as a letter to John Ramsey McCulloch of 1821 
and The Petition of the Merchants of London of 18 19, he introduces the much more intemperate, and 
typically Benthamite, equation of the laws of political economy to the propositions of geometry (8:388, 
390; 5:38; compare Sowell 1974, 118-19).  After basic laws and derived laws, Ricardo mentions 
“tendencies.”  
Richard Whately criticized his contemporaries’ ambiguity in their use of the term “tendency,” sometimes 
meaning “the existence of a cause which, if operating unimpeded, would produce a certain result,” and 
sometimes meaning “the existence of such a state of things that that result may be expected to take place” 
(Whately [ 18311 1847, 231-32), and thus failing to distinguish between “analytical” propositions and 
historical generalizations (De Marchi 1970, 258-64; Sowell 1974, 132-37). Ricardo’s tendencies may be 
interpreted in terms of “contingent predictions” (De Marchi 1970, 259), deduced from the fundamental 
laws, the derived laws, and a set of hypotheses that would be required to mount Ricardo’s model of the 
British economy of his day. Thus, they belong too to an idealized model, and no claim is made to their being 
statements of fact. A list of Ricardo’s tendencies should include: the “natural tendency of profits... to fall” 
([1817] 1951, l: 120); the tendency of rent to rise (1: 78); the tendency of the wages of labor to fall (1: 101); 
and the tendency of the necessaries of life to become dearer (1: 93), which is the most basic-and 
“Malthusian”-tendency, on which the first three are eventually dependent. Ricardo was aware that those 
tendencies are at work in an idealized world. In fact, he repeats over and over again that he is not 
considering concrete facts but rather “strong cases.”  
 
 
Questions of Fact and Questions of Science  
One of Ricardo’s basic concerns was not very far from Malthus’s, namely, a plea for theory as against crude 
empiricism (see letter to Malthus, 24 January 1817; 1951-73, 3: 181,239). But from that shared 
preoccupation diverging attitudes derived. Ricardo insists repeatedly on the distinction between questions 
of “fact and degree” and “questions of principle” (letter to Trower 15 September 1820; 1951-73, 8: 234). 
One of the main sources of his misunderstandings with Malthus is his stubborn insistence on the logical 
analysis of the hypothetical case under scrutiny, without confusing it with discussions of concrete aspects 
(letter to Malthus, 11 October 1921; 1951-73, 9: 95-97). He is aware that in the real world the propositions 
of political economy hold in a very imperfect way, but for him science seems to deal with an idealized 
world. His typical answer to Malthus’s objections is that something “is a question of fact not of science” 
(letter to Malthus, 22 October 1911; 6: 64; compare Blaug 1958, 187-88). A mark of Ricardo’s attitude is the 
use of “strong cases.” These are idealized situations, based on avowedly unrealistic assumptions ([1819] 
1951, 1: 121-22; see also 1951-73, 4: 312; 8: 184). In 1820, he reproached Malthus for considering his book 
“as more practical than I intended it to be. My object was to elucidate principles” (8: 184). He had made the 
same kind of theoretical retreat before, aimed at immunizing his own theory against criticism, by turning 
the consideration on which Malthus’s approach was based into a defensive weapon for his own approach. 
Complexity and multiplicity of causes provide reasons for abstractness and simplicity of explanations. 
Ricardo had indeed written to Malthus that, granted that there are “So many operating causes in Political 
Economy. . . there is a great danger in appealing to experience in favour of a particular doctrine” (letter to 
Malthus, 7 October 1815; 1951-73, 6: 295). And the test par excellence of a satisfactory explanation might 
be its simplicity or - as Ricardo expressed himself on one occasion - its ability to account “for all the 
phenomena in an easy, natural manner” (letter to Malthus, 17 April 1815; 1951-73, 6: 214). According to 
Adam Smith, it was excessive fondness of simplicity that led Descartes astray (Smith [1795] 1980, sect. 4, 
par. 6; compare Cremaschi 1984, 4147). This was also Malthus’s preoccupation vis-à-vis Ricardo.  
Ricardo’s countermoves in the face of Malthus’s objections were essentially based on the criterion that 
what matters is the long run: Malthus always has in mind “the immediate and temporary effects of 
particular changes” while Ricardo fixes his “whole attention on the permanent state of things which will 
result” from those changes (1951-73, 7: 120). Thus, faced with objections based on empirical evidence, he 
tends to protect his position by retreating from experience. 17  
Why is Ricardo, once he had constructed an idealized model, still at odds with what Bernard Cohen 
describes as Newton’s final stage? In this stage, additional conditions are gradually added to the model so 
that “the system and its conditions no longer represent merely nature simplified and idealized or an 
imaginative mathematical construct, but seem to conform to (or at least to duplicate) his realities of the 
external world” (Cohen 1980, 64). The answer suggested by De Marchi is that his concept of “natural” 
implied some confusion between that which is basic and that which actually prevails in the long run (1970, 
264). Thus, the “natural” price is the purchasing power that a commodity “would possess, if not disturbed 
                                                             
17 On “insulating strategies,” see Dascal 1990. 
by any temporary or accidental cause” (1951-73, 1:92). All the features of his idealized cases, Ricardo 
assumed, were also the main ones in the real world. So, on the one hand, his idealized models are immune 
from criticism, insofar as no claim to their realism is implied, but, on the other hand they provide a 
sufficient basis for policy advice in so far as the main forces at work in the actual world are supposed to be 
those described by the model, and what is left is “temporary and accidental.” As a result, not only Ricardo’s 
laws but also his four tendencies may be safely considered to be as “certain as the law of gravitation” 
(letter to Malthus, 27 March 1815; 1951-73, 6: 204). After that, one should not be surprised when faced 
with testimonies by some of his contemporaries about his attitude, which is that of a man ‘‘herissé de 
principes” and with a complete “disregard of experience and practice” (J. L. Mallet’s manuscript diary, 
quoted in Ricardo 1951-73, 8: 152).18 Yet, an important development may have occurred toward the end of 
Ricardo’s life, when he wrote the machinery chapter. Remarkably, it paralleled the evolution of Malthus’s 
thought after the first Essay, namely, from an absolute belief to a less absolute belief in the unchanging 
character of economic laws. It is worth noting that McCulloch immediately perceived this change (see 
McCulloch to Ricardo, 5 June 1821; 1951-73, 9: 382). This point has been stressed by John Davis (1989), 
developing De Marchi’s argument and highlighting the role of a philosophical assumption in Ricardo’s 
thinking, namely, the classical belief in a “natural” order. From that order, both explanations (in terms of 
cause-and-effect relationships) and prescriptions (in terms of courses of action leading to the maximum 
amount of good) were derived. It was this philosophical outlook that often short-circuited Ricardo’s 
idealized models with the “real” core of phenomena, beyond temporary variations.19 In the chapter on 
machinery, Ricardo introduced a few preconditions for seriously undermining not only a number of positive 
views he had held, but also a basic feature of his general outlook, expressed on one occasion by the remark 
that “the principles of true political economy never changed” (Speech on Silk Manufacture Bill, 21 May 
1823; 1951-73, 5: 296). In fact, the Malthusian population law ceases to apply in an unqualified way, since 
“unemployment may occur which is not of the temporary sort” and “re-employment which does occur 
from the extension of production or expansion of service employment adjusts the number of labourers by 
social intervention” (Davis 1989, 473-74; compare Milgate and Stimson 1991, 116-1 8). And the law of 
                                                             
18 See also another passage quoted in Weatherall 1976, in which Mallet writes, “What was said of Priestley, is not 
altogether inapplicable to Ricardo: that he followed truth, as a man who hawks follows his sport, at full speed, straight 
forward, looking only upward, and regardless of the difficulties into which the chase might lead him” (63). Another 
judgment of the same tenor is the one, quoted above, by Lord Brougham (see Ricardo 1951-73,5:xxxiii, 128). 
19 Davis stresses the fact that in Ricardo’s identification of long run with the natural and of short run with the 
accidental effects rests on the presupposition that “temporary effects” are randomly common to all periods, and thus, 
leaving those effects aside, the laws of political economy may be thought to be inherently ahistorical (Davis 1989, 
460). The point may be further highlighted by comparison with Dugald Stewart’s claim of a historical character of the 
laws of political economy (see Stewart 1854, 1:222). 
diminishing returns in agriculture is modified in an important sense, in that he now allows that technical 
progress is successful in counteracting declining productivity (Davis 1989, 474).Thus, social choices have a 
bearing on which of the possible developments will take place, both in matters of employment and in 
matters of agricultural production (the factor supposedly ruling over the development of the economy as a 
whole). Davis’s conclusion is that “in the end, the laws of political economy cease to be natural ones. They 
are now socially constituted.... Political economy, therefore, becomes an inescapably social and historical 
discipline” (480). Ricardo “did not draw these conclusions” (480), and yet it is significant that the 
modifications in his way of understanding economic laws match the earlier modifications in Malthus’s way 
of understanding the law of population. Ricardo probably did not live long enough to draw the full 
implications of what he had written in the new chapter. The massive philosophical reading he carried out at 
Gatcomb took place between the first and the third edition of the Principles, and one may suspect that the 
consequences of this reading were felt somehow in Ricardo’s additions to the third edition, since they 
ultimately raised the question of the status of economic laws.  
 
 
Partial Conclusions on Ricardo’s Methodology  
Ricardo’s “busy mind” was able to make room for philosophical and theological interests. His modesty 
misled Halevy as to his supposed dependence on Mill and Schumpeter regarding the breadth of his 
intellectual interests. Ricardo’s “cast of mind” resulted also from philosophical influences: it was molded 
possibly in a former phase by the teachings of Belsham; a certain similarity between this cast of mind and 
the mind of the “Bentham and Mill school” was probably perceived by Ricardo in a later phase; and 
Ricardo’s intellectual horizons were expanding toward the end of his life, among other things, through 
closer acquaintance with the Scottish tradition, and yielding less and less compliance to James Mill. But the 
key item in Ricardo’s philosophical and methodological grounding was an idea he inherited from Belsham: 
the limits-to-knowledge thesis, or the claim that essences (understood in terms of the Newtonian 
distinction between explanatory principles and principles in re) are unknowable. This idea yielded a peculiar 
match of radical skepticism with apriorism, a match quite different from the Scottish blend of non-
rationalistic realism and experimentalism.  
 
 
Conclusion  
 
We have reconstructed two methodologies. These evolved in the course of a controversy between their 
authors. It remains to be seen how these methodologies interacted with positive claims, and whether there 
was any consistency between the strategies used in the controversy and the explicit methodologies. These 
are questions we explore in another article (Cremaschi and Dascal, forthcoming). At this stage, our 
conclusions are the following.  
 First, Malthus’s and Ricardo’s “laws of economic science” are partly overlapping, as shown in table 1. In 
practice, while exceptions are admitted by Malthus for almost all economic laws, for Ricardo even 
contingent predictions allow no exceptions, apart from temporary variations that, being distributed 
randomly through different historical phases, are best dealt with by leaving them in the limbo of the 
unscientific. For Malthus, even the law of population seems gradually to shift from one category to the 
other, because after 1798 so many counteracting forces are discovered by him that the consequences of 
that law become postponed almost indefinitely. By 1821 Ricardo’s refusal to permit exceptions is not so 
absolute, for important exceptions even to the laws of the most basic category become conceivable as he 
writes the chapter on machinery.   
Second, we face a sustained conflict between two economists both professing adherence to the same 
Newtonian paradigm. This puzzle may be solved by taking into account the varieties of eighteenth-century 
Newtonianism. Malthus derived from the MacLaurin version of Newtonianism an anti-deductivist, anti-
apriorist methodology aspiring to exactness. Ricardo’s Newtonianism reflects Priestley’s and Belsham’s 
reading of the paradigm, anti-Cartesian insofar as it maintains a skeptical position on the knowledge of 
essences, but inclined to turn skeptical arguments into a defense of apriorism; in a word, inspiring a 
methodology of rigor (see Granger 1955, 295-327; 1959, 103).  
 Third, Ricardo avowed his exclusive interest in “permanent states,” as opposed to Malthus who 
concentrated on what happens in the “intervals.” The shared concept of proportions receives different 
overtones resulting from the divergent choices above. That is, for Ricardo, economics is a  
science of proportions (dealing with the laws that regulate the shares of the national product allotted to 
the three main classes), and the optimal proportion is the object of the science. Yet, equilibrium typically 
does not constitute a problem for him, since the optimal proportion is dictated by the laws of a natural 
order of society, dependent, in its turn, on the relationships of society itself with its physical and biological 
preconditions. All of this holds true before the machinery chapter. Malthus, on the contrary, from 1803 on 
opts for focusing on what happens in the short run. This leads him gradually to question his 1798 belief in a 
natural order. Thus, Malthus comes close to formulating what was to become the main problem of 
postclassical economic science, the problem of equilibrium (or, equilibrium as a problem). For him, the 
doctrine of optimal proportion fills the void that was later occupied by Walras’s general equilibrium theory.  
Fourth, a certain trend in twentieth-century philosophy of science contends that a theory, in order to 
explain, should also be able to predict.  
When judged by this standard, Ricardo (who looks more like a “scientist”) hardly does any better than his 
opponent. The cul-de-sac in which both have been caught-Malthus until 1803, Ricardo until 1823-is that of 
the ambiguity of the concept of tendency. This ill-defined term (as noted by Whately) indicates both the 
fruit of an abstraction and a “deeper” reality and makes theories either over-predictive or virtually 
incapable of prediction. In Malthus’s case, after 1803, the consequences of this ambiguity are stemmed by 
his preoccupation with the realism of hypotheses and by his willingness to build the complexity of causal 
agencies into his theories. In Ricardo, they are left unchecked until the third edition of the Principles.  
Fifth, what is classical in both, beyond their divergences, is precisely that feature which almost everybody 
has criticized in the classics, namely, the enlighteners’ idea of a natural order. Both the fact of taking the 
problem of equilibrium as already solved and that of confusing two senses of “tendency” depend on this 
key idea. We face here a misplaced perception of the concreteness of an idealized model, which is mistaken 
for a hidden structure behind the phenomena. As a consequence, for both authors what is basic logically 
within the model tends to be confused with what is in a stronger sense “real” within, or behind, the 
phenomena and will accordingly prevail in the long run.  
  
Table 1  
 
Malthus  
 
A.  
The fixed laws of necessity or of nature  
(tendencies always at work)  
 
The two postulates or fixed laws of human nature:  
(i) that food is necessary to the existence of man  
(ii) that the passion between the sexes is necessary, and will remain nearly in its present state  
 
B.  
The most basic principles (established on basic human passions):  
(i) the law of population  
(ii) the law of diminishing returns in agriculture  
 
C. The usual propositions of political economy (only probable, admitting of exceptions)  
 
 
Ricardo  
A.  
Basic laws or principles (or axiomata)  
(i)  The law of diminishing returns in agriculture  
(ii) The principle of population  
(iii) Say's law  
(iv) The common principles of supply and demand  
 
B.  
Derived laws (natural and constant cause-effect relations)  
The laws regulating wages and profits  
 
C.  
Tendencies (contingent predictions)  
(i) The natural tendency of profits to fall  
(ii)  The tendency of rent to rise  
(iii)  The tendency of the wages of labour to fall  
(iv)  The tendency of the necessaries of life to become dearer  
 
D.  
Accidental causes and temporary effects  
---------------------------------------------------------- 
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